RHETORICAL INTENTIONALITY ATTRIBUTION - ITS ONTOGENY IN ORDINARY CONVERSATION

Citation
M. Bonaiuto et A. Fasulo, RHETORICAL INTENTIONALITY ATTRIBUTION - ITS ONTOGENY IN ORDINARY CONVERSATION, British journal of social psychology, 36, 1997, pp. 511-536
Citations number
77
ISSN journal
01446665
Volume
36
Year of publication
1997
Part
4
Pages
511 - 536
Database
ISI
SICI code
0144-6665(1997)36:<511:RIA-IO>2.0.ZU;2-8
Abstract
This paper addresses the assumption that the epistemological dichotomy between reality and its construction is an everyday rhetorical tool c hildren and adults use in their explanations and arguments. Within a d iscursive psychology perspective, the phenomenon of attribution of rhe torical intentionality (AIR) is theoretically defined developing the n otion of 'prepackaged interest attribution technique' (Edwards & Porte r, 1992). AIR consists in an explanation of others' discursive moves i n terms of a rhetorical-argumentative activity; that is, in terms of a deliberate attempt aimed at construing and presenting reality as a fu nction of the speaker's point of view, perspective and interests, in o rder to affect the listener's mental state (belief, knowledge, intenti on) or action. Theoretical links are made to the theory of mind paradi gm in the study of intentionality attribution, particularly to the 'fo rm of life' approach which defines intentionality attribution in terms of language games. On this basis, the present study examines the stru ctures and functions of AIR used by children and their parents in ever yday conversation. Qualitative discourse analysis of transcripts of 22 dinner conversations from eight Italian families shows explicit and i mplicit AIR in children from three and a half to seven years of age. M oreover, parents attribute rhetorical intentionality to their children , contributing to their social construction as rhetorical speakers. AI R is used as a rhetorical strategy within disputes and argumentative c ontexts, often achieving topic closure. Results are discussed with ref erence to the ontological status of intentionalist talk.