CRITICAL REALISM AND THE LIMITS TO CRITICAL SOCIAL-SCIENCE

The paper assesses the aims and arguments of critical social science a nd the reconstructions of it provided by critical realist philosophy. It argues that attempts to derive normative conclusions on the basis o f explanatory critiques of social phenomena are flawed in several impo rtant respects. Accounts of critical social science standardly underes timate the problems of justifying critical standpoints and finding alt ernative social forms which generate fewer problems than those they re place, and hence lead to net improvement. By arguing that value positi ons can be derived from explanatory critiques, the philosophical recon structions make light of the normative issues raised by proposals for social change. They also ignore the question of the feasibility of alt ernative systems and the prevalence of structures which generate both good and bad effects. While the reconstructions succeed in defending c ritiques centering on straightforward cases of false beliefs or the fr ustration of universal human needs, in others, where culturally-specif ic needs and issues of social responsibilities are involved, they fail to recognise the need to address prior normative questions. It is the refore argued that the aims and claims of critical social science need to be moderated and its dependence on normative discourse properly ac knowledged.