RHETORIC AND RATIONALITY - A STUDY OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE SOVIET-UNION

Can political actors use rational strategies for political conflict wh en established institutions are unavailable to structure political cho ices because the institutions are themselves among the contested issue s? In Soviet politics from 1985 to 1991, cross-cutting cleavages place d in question the possibility of any stable outcome. We argue that a m ulti-dimensional issue space was reduced to a single dimension, along which Mikhail Gorbachev could temporarily occupy a median, by the inte raction between Gorbachev's own rhetoric and rhetorical tactics used b y leaders of his nomenklatura opposition, by Boris Yeltsin as the lead er of the democratic opposition, and by single-issue groups called nef ormaly. The match between these four players' rhetorics and the four s trategic options identified by a simple spatial model offers empirical evidence that rational strategies were available despite institutiona l flux.