SKINNER - FROM DETERMINISM TO RANDOM VARIATION

The assumption that Skinner was a determinist requires some modificati on. Although Skinner may have favored determinism to varying degrees w hile he was advancing mechanistic accounts of behavior that were align ed with the views such as those of Loeb, Watson, and Russell, his adva ncement of determinism disappeared after his accounts became more clos ely aligned with selectionist views such as those of Mach, Peirce, and Dewey. This realignment entailed a switch from finding origins or sou rces for behavior in deterministic laws to finding origins or sources for behavior in random variation. Some sense of the conflict between t hese views appears early on in Skinner's writing, and arguments in fav or of both of these views can be found in sources that Skinner identif ied in his writings. Although there were good reasons for Skinner to a ccept determinism when he was advancing a mechanistic behaviorism, the re were also good reasons for Skinner to abandon determinism when he w as advancing a selectionist behaviorism.