BAYES AND BEYOND

Several leading topics outstanding after John Earman's Bayes or Bust? are investigated further, with emphasis on the relevance of Bayesian e xplication in epistemology of science, despite certain limitations. (1 ) Dutch Book arguments are reformulated so that their independence fro m utility and preference in epistemic contexts is evident. (2) The Bay esian analysis of the Quine-Duhem problem is pursued; the phenomenon o f a ''protective belt'' of auxiliary statements around reasonably succ essful theories is explicated. (3) The Bayesian approach to understand ing the superiority of variety of evidence is pursued; a recent challe nge (by Wayne) is converted into a positive result on behalf of the Ba yesian analysis, potentially with far-reaching consequences. (4) The c ondition for applying the merger-of-opinion results and the thesis of underdetermination of theories are compared, revealing significant lim itations in applicability of the former. (5) Implications concerning ' 'diachronic Dutch Book'' arguments and ''non-Bayesian shifts'' are dra wn, highlighting the incompleteness, but not incorrectness, of Bayesia n analysis.