ALLOWING CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL-REGULATION - AN EMPIRICAL-ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF RIGHT-TO-SUE AND RIGHT-TO-KNOW PROVISIONS ON INDUSTRYS TOXIC EMISSIONS
Ds. Grant, ALLOWING CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL-REGULATION - AN EMPIRICAL-ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF RIGHT-TO-SUE AND RIGHT-TO-KNOW PROVISIONS ON INDUSTRYS TOXIC EMISSIONS, Social science quarterly, 78(4), 1997, pp. 859-873
Objective. Extant research is inconclusive about whether policies that
allow citizen participation in environmental regulation reduce pollut
ion. This study attempts to advance our understanding of these new for
ms of regulation by empirically investigating the effects of state-spo
nsored right-to-sue and right-to-know provisions. Methods. This resear
ch utilizes data from the Toxic Release Inventory in a pooled, cross-s
ectional, time-series analysis of state patterns of industrial toxic e
missions. Results. Findings indicate that, net of other predictors, st
ates that have right-to-sue laws or that provide substantial funding f
or right-to-know programs have significantly lower rates of toxic emis
sions over time. Conclusions. Results are consistent with the argument
s of conflict environmental sociologists, who suggest that, unless cit
izens are provided real resources to mobilize their interests, citizen
participation schemes will tend to be only symbolic gestures.