Governments face a lower apparent cost of capital than private firms.
However, the low cost of borrowing by governments does not reflect sup
erior capabilities to choose or manage projects. Instead, it reflects
the fact that governments have recourse to taxpayers, who de facto pro
vide a fairly open-ended credit insurance to the government. If taxpay
ers were remunerated for the risk they assume in the case of tax-finan
ced projects, then ex ante there would be no capital cost advantage to
government finance. The risk premium on government finance would, in
principle be no different from that of private investors. There is thu
s no justification on the basis of capital cost advantages for governm
ent funding or guaranteeing the provision of private goods or-services
. Privatization is, therefore, valuable, if it improves business effic
iency when evaluated at the risk-adjusted private cost of capital. No
more need be demonstrated in a value-for-money test.