TENANTS DILEMMA - ON COLLECTIVE ACTION IN HOUSING

This paper discusses tenant participation in a rational choice perspec tive, where collective action will neither be initiated, nor maintaine d, unless found profitable in one way or another by every single indiv idual taking part. This 'n-person prisoners' dilemma' indicates that n ot the failures but the successful cases of tenant participation call for an explanation. It is claimed that a better understanding of colle ctive action in housing may be developed only if the general and speci fic conditions of the local housing arena are considered. This include s the following assertions: (1) different tenants may have different m otives for taking part in collective action; (2) the dynamics of the r elations between tenants must be considered when analysing the conditi ons of initiating and retaining ca-operation; (3) there are different types of collective action in housing, including collective consumptio n, collective work and collective decision-making; (4) the physical an d social conditions of specific housing estates can be move or less fa vourable to co-operation; (5) tenure forms often define the institutio nal conditions of collective action in housing.