INSTITUTIONALIZING CHINESE LEGISLATURES - TRADE-OFFS BETWEEN AUTONOMYAND CAPACITY

Citation
Kj. Obrien et Lm. Luehrmann, INSTITUTIONALIZING CHINESE LEGISLATURES - TRADE-OFFS BETWEEN AUTONOMYAND CAPACITY, Legislative studies quarterly, 23(1), 1998, pp. 91-108
Citations number
52
Categorie Soggetti
Political Science
ISSN journal
03629805
Volume
23
Issue
1
Year of publication
1998
Pages
91 - 108
Database
ISI
SICI code
0362-9805(1998)23:1<91:ICL-TB>2.0.ZU;2-S
Abstract
Some leaders of Chinese local people's congresses emphasize autonomy i n order to promote decentralization and enhance representation. Other legislative insiders favor sacrificing autonomy in order to strengthen capacity and improve oversight. Tight coupling between congresses app eals to local legislators because it offers opportunities to mobilize supporters, obtain resources, and expand jurisdiction, while represent atives of higher congresses often oppose closer ties in order to prese rve local initiative, safeguard elections, and reduce conflict with Pa rty committees. In a reforming communist state, single legislatures ma y not be the right unit of analysis for assessing autonomy. Establishe d boundaries, in the early stages of institutionalization, may apply t o the legislative system as a whole rather than to its parts. And soft ening boundaries between congresses at different levels can harden bou ndaries against other bureaucracies.