WHERE STANDPOINT STANDS NOW

I argue, in opposition to recent criticism by Helen Longino and Richmo nd Campbell, that standpoint theory is needed for a feminist account o f knowledge. Its recently emerging empiricist tendencies do not make i t redundant and unnecessarily confrontational. Feminist empiricism dir ects us to seek out different perspectives, and standpoint theory enha nces empirical resources by increasing the variety of available perspe ctives through redressing political marginalization. Standpoint theory aims to counteract the deleterious affects of oppression on the avail ability of unique resources for knowledge, which cannot be achieved on a strictly empiricist account. Nancy Hartsock's article ''The Feminis t Standpoint: Towards a Specifically Feminist Historical Materialism,' ' from the first collection of feminist epistemology, Discovering Real ity (1983a), is the locus classicus of standpoint theory. Since then, however, standpoint theory has metamorphosed such that it is in many w ays unrecognizable as Hartsock's approach, and its similarity to the t heories known as ''feminist empiricism'' is increasingly apparent. Sta ndpoint theory is grounded in the materialism of its Marxian origins a nd so is committed in its inception to a version of empiricism: knowle dge depends on experience. More specifically, standpoint theory is inc reasingly like feminist empiricism in viewing greater experience as en hancing the quality of knowledge.