Ja. Schlesinger et Ms. Schlesinger, DUAL-BALLOT ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL-PARTIES - THE FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL-ELECTION OF 1995, Comparative political studies, 31(1), 1998, pp. 72-97
Although the effect of electoral rules on the number of parties in dem
ocracies has been well explored, little attention had been paid to the
ir effect on the parties themselves. The authors examine this problem
within the context of French two-ballot rules, which illuminate partis
an distinctions rather than blur them as single-ballot rules do. Earli
er studies demonstrated that the dual-ballot rules used in French legi
slative elections allowed four ways of winning, in response to which f
our stable parties emerged. The French presidential election further i
lluminated these distinctions. Because there is only one winner, the c
ontest becomes personalized, heightening partisan distinctions in elec
toral strategies, appeals, and organization. Examining this effect in
the 1995 presidential election, the authors conclude that the French d
ual ballot provides a tool for understanding not only French parties b
ut also parties in which single-ballot rules force all to use similar
electoral strategies and appeals.