DUAL-BALLOT ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL-PARTIES - THE FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL-ELECTION OF 1995

Citation
Ja. Schlesinger et Ms. Schlesinger, DUAL-BALLOT ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL-PARTIES - THE FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL-ELECTION OF 1995, Comparative political studies, 31(1), 1998, pp. 72-97
Citations number
49
Categorie Soggetti
Political Science
ISSN journal
00104140
Volume
31
Issue
1
Year of publication
1998
Pages
72 - 97
Database
ISI
SICI code
0010-4140(1998)31:1<72:DEAP-T>2.0.ZU;2-3
Abstract
Although the effect of electoral rules on the number of parties in dem ocracies has been well explored, little attention had been paid to the ir effect on the parties themselves. The authors examine this problem within the context of French two-ballot rules, which illuminate partis an distinctions rather than blur them as single-ballot rules do. Earli er studies demonstrated that the dual-ballot rules used in French legi slative elections allowed four ways of winning, in response to which f our stable parties emerged. The French presidential election further i lluminated these distinctions. Because there is only one winner, the c ontest becomes personalized, heightening partisan distinctions in elec toral strategies, appeals, and organization. Examining this effect in the 1995 presidential election, the authors conclude that the French d ual ballot provides a tool for understanding not only French parties b ut also parties in which single-ballot rules force all to use similar electoral strategies and appeals.