DETERRENCE THEORY AND THE SPIRAL MODEL REVISITED

The theoretical literature of interstate conflict is dominated by two conceptual models, classical deterrence theory and the spiral model. T he fundamental tenet of classical deterrence theory is that credible a nd capable threats can prevent the initiation, and contain the escalat ion, of conflict. By contrast, proponents of the spiral model claim th at the prescriptions associated with deterrence theory frequently lead to vicious cycles of reciprocated conflict. According to Jervis 'both sets of theorists fail to discuss the conditions under which their th eories will not apply'. In this article we do just that, identifying a nd comparing the conditions associated with conflict spirals and with crisis stability, in the context of a game-theoretic escalation model with incomplete information. For the special case in which a challenge r is likely willing to endure an all-out conflict, our analysis indica tes that the conditions associated with successful deterrence, limited conflict, and escalated conflict are mutually exclusive.