Ek. Hwang, SIMULATION OF POLITICAL-DEVELOPMENT, POLITICAL-CONFLICT, AND REGULATION POLICIES, Journal of political & military sociology, 25(2), 1997, pp. 249-278
What are the relationships among political development, political conf
lict and attempts to regulate political conflict? I approach this ques
tion from both empirical analyses and a simulation model in order to b
etter understand the interactive relationships. The relevant data are
extracted from the ''Time-series Cross-national Data Archive'' constru
cted by A. Banks, and the ''World Handbook of Political and Social Ind
icator III'' constructed by Taylor and Jodice. The tentative result of
the sensitivity analysis of the simulation model shows that political
development does matter. Its findings support Huntington (1968). That
is, the relationship of political development and political violence
is an inverse U-curve. Insurgency is minor in the less developed and h
ighly developed systems, but it occurs most often in the developing sy
stems. The relationship of political development and protest is positi
ve; the higher the political development, the more the protest behavio
rs. However, the correlation of political development and sanctions is
negative. This finding supports Gurr and Lichbach (1986), Henderson (
1991), and Ziegenhagen (1994). Yet, the relationship of political deve
lopment and sanction apparatus is positive. Finally, the highly develo
ped systems are distinguished by their limited use of sanctions and by
their ability to handle political violence.