AFTER FINDLAY - A CONSIDERATION OF SOME ASPECTS OF THE MILITARY-JUSTICE SYSTEM

This article looks critically at the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Findlay v. United Kingdom, and at the changes to the court martial system embodied in the Armed Forces Act 1996 and arising from criticisms made of the system in that case. It demonstrates that the basis of the decision was the European Court's perception that a possibility of lack of impartiality was inherent in the court martial system by reason of its structures and procedures, rather than any act ual lack of impartiality in the case before it. The article goes on to argue that to a large extent the 1996 Act does no more than give form al effect to what was already established practice, and that the dange r of lack of impartiality prior to the changes was far more a matter o f theory than of reality. It goes on to look at the procedures now in place, and suggests that the serviceman tried by court martial may in some ways enjoy more protection against injustice than the person trie d in the ordinary criminal courts.