Tjm. Vandooren et Jaj. Metz, DELAYED MATURATION IN TEMPORALLY STRUCTURED POPULATIONS WITH NONEQUILIBRIUM DYNAMICS, Journal of evolutionary biology, 11(1), 1998, pp. 41-62
In this paper we study the evolutionary dynamics of delayed maturation
in semelparous individuals. We model this in a two-stage clonally rep
roducing population subject to density-dependent fertility. The popula
tion dynamical model allows multiple - cyclic and/or chaotic - attract
ors, thus allowing us to illustrate how (i) evolutionary stability is
primarily a property of a population dynamical system as a whole, and
(ii) that the evolutionary stability of a demographic strategy by nece
ssity derives from the evolutionary stability of the stationary popula
tion dynamical systems it can engender, i.e., its associated populatio
n dynamical attractors. Our approach is based on numerically estimatin
g invasion exponents or ''mutant fitnesses''. The invasion exponent is
defined as the theoretical long-term average relative growth rate of
a population of mutants in the stationary environment defined by a res
ident population system. For some combinations of resident and mutant
trait values, we have to consider multi-valued invasion exponents, whi
ch makes the evolutionary argument more complicated (and more interest
ing) than is usually envisaged. Multi-valuedness occurs (i) when more
than one attractor is associated with the values of the residents' dem
ographic parameters, or (ii) when the setting of the mutant parameters
makes the descendants of a single mutant reproduce exclusively either
in even or in odd years, so that a mutant population is affected by e
ither subsequence of the fluctuating resident densities only. Non-equi
librium population dynamics or random environmental noise selects for
strategists with a non-zero probability to delay maturation. When ther
e is an evolutionarily attracting pair of such a strategy and a popula
tion dynamical attractor engendered by it, this delaying probability i
s a Continuously Stable Strategy, that is an Evolutionarily Unbeatable
Strategy which is also Stable in a long term evolutionary sense. Popu
lation dynamical coexistence of delaying and non-delaying strategists
is possible with non-equilibrium dynamics, but adding random environme
ntal noise to the model destroys this coexistence. Adding random noise
also shifts the CSS towards a higher probability of delaying maturati
on.