This paper is in three parts. In Part One we briefly explain that an u
nsophisticated form of utilitarianism-economic rationalism (ER)-has be
come dominant in many health systems. Its proponents argue that one of
ER's most important effects is to increase consumer choice. However,
evidence from New Zealand does not support this claim. Furthermore, th
e logic of ER requires the construction of systems which tend to restr
ict individual participation. In Part Two we argue that although some
have advocated an 'ethic of care' in an attempt to counteract ER's uti
litarianism, two decades of campaigning have had little influence on h
ealth policy. ER's pro-care adversaries have failed to make an impact
because they have not developed a taxonomy of fare-they have not estab
lished a language compatible with, or as powerful as, ER's. In Part Th
ree, in an attempt to raise the conceptual and practical status of car
ing in contemporary health systems, we distinguish four different form
s of care. In opposition to those who believe the 'ethic of care' can
adequately direct health care practice, we demonstrate that care is a
secondary notion. We show that in order for a carer to decide which fo
rm of care to adopt in different situations she requires a more powerf
ul idea. We contend further that health care ought to be governed by a
theory of health, and suggest that 'the foundations theory of health'
should be adopted by planners searching for a more humane alternative
to ER. We conclude that ER's dominance can and must be challenged. Ho
wever, only those arguments which offer detailed theoretical analyses
of health care, as well as meticulously derived practical policies, ha
ve any chance of success. (C) 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.