We consider a monetary growth model essentially identical to that of D
iamond (1965) and Tirole (1985), except that we explicitly model credi
t markets, a credit market friction, and an allocative function for fi
nancial intermediaries. These changes yield substantially different re
sults than those obtained in more standard models. In particular, if a
ny monetary steady state equilibria exist, there are generally two of
them; one of these has a low capital stock and output level, and it is
necessarily a saddle. The other steady state has a high capital stock
and output level; either it is necessarily a sink, or its stability p
roperties depend on the rate of money creation. It follows that moneta
ry equilibria can be indeterminate, and nonconvergence phenomena can b
e observed. Increases in the rate of money creation reduce the capital
stock in the high-capital-stock steady state. If the high-capital-sto
ck steady state is not a sink for all rates of money growth, then incr
eases in the rate of money growth can induce a Hopf bifurcation. Hence
dynamical equilibria can display damped oscillation as a steady state
equilibrium is approached, and limit cycles can be observed as well.
In addition, in the latter case, high enough rates of inflation induce
the kinds of ''crises'' noted by Bruno and Easterly (1995): when infl
ation is too high there are no equilibrium paths approaching the high-
activity steady state.