ARMS TRANSFER DEPENDENCE AND FOREIGN-POLICY CONFLICT

There are both military and political dimensions to arms transfers, an d their effects on state behavior may not be the same. In this article I examine the degree to which arms transfers and arms transfer depend ence interact to affect foreign policy conflict. I hypothesize that, a s a transfer of military capability, weapons shipments increase the te ndency of the recipient to strike a conflictual posture in its foreign policy, while arms transfer dependence restrains that tendency. An ar ms recipient faces the possibility that weapons shipments will be curt ailed during periods of regional crisis and hostility, and when a stat e is dependent on one or a few major suppliers for the bulk of its imp orted weaponry, the costs associated with supply restrictions increase s. This should encourage restraint on the parr of states otherwise emb oldened by arms acquisitions. My analysis treats conflictual behavior as a multiplicative function of arms transfers and arms transfer depen dence. Parameter estimates are derived from time series data for nine states engaged in enduring rivalries during the Cold War. For some of these states, there is evidence that arms shipments encouraged more co nflictual foreign policies; but there is also evidence that this prope nsity was tempered by the degree of arms transfer dependence. The mode l is nonlinear, so the precise effects of dependence vary depending on context - i.e. the stare's current level of arms importation and depe ndence - but realistic predictions involve changes in foreign policy c onflict equal to 5 - 25 % of their mean levels during the period.