THE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN CONSTITUTIONAL A ND DIRECT DEMOCRACY

The first part of the paper contains an analytical connection of the v arious forms of direct democracy with Lijphart's two types of democrac y by means of an input-output analysis. By considering the majority-mi nority dimension at the moments of initiation and decision of a refere ndum election, plebiscites and compulsory referendums without quorums of consent correspond to the type of majority democracy, whereas optio nal referendums and popular initiatives with quorums of consent show t ypical characteristics of power-sharing. By taking into consideration the predominance of the model of representative democracy, this classi fication also proves to be correct in a first comparison of industrial nations. The second part attempts an explanation of the different use of popular rights (optional referendums and popular initiatives) by m inorities in the consociational systems of the two dozen member states of Switzerland (cantons) by looking at the degree of development of t he elements of power-sharing. According to this compensatory thesis of consociationalism, 'oppositional popular rights' are used the less fr equently, the more inclusive the voters' portions of the government co alition and the more developed the federative structures. While the di sproportionality degree of the electoral system, socio-cultural differ ences, and institutional restrictions do not exert any influence on th e different use of direct democracy in Switzerland's member states, mo dernization indicators and the strength of green parties prove to be a dditional independent factors of explanation.