FREEDOM AND A RIGHT (NOT) TO KNOW

The article discusses the relationship between the nation of a moral r ight to personal self-determination, the notion of a moral right to kn ow and the notion of a moral right not to know. In particular, the aut hor asks under what conditions, if any, the right to self-determinatio n implies a right to have information ora right not to have informatio n. The conclusions he defends are theoretical in character rather than concrete norms and directions, and they are intended to be relevant i n many contexts, not only in the context of information concerning, sa y, medical decisions. Tet the author restates the question concerning the right to have and especially the right not to have genetic knowled ge about one's own genes on the basis of a right to self-determination . He argues that a right (not) to have genetic information can be defe nded on the ground of a right to self-determination, but that this kin d of defense presupposes several normative, and controversial, argumen ts.