M. Waldman, ELIMINATING THE MARKET FOR SECONDHAND GOODS - AN ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION FOR LEASING, The Journal of law & economics, 40(1), 1997, pp. 61-92
There are a number of prominent specific instances in which a durable
goods manufacturer with significant market power employed a lease-only
policy: (i) United Shoe in the market for shoe machinery, (ii) IBM in
the market for computers, and (iii) Xerox in the market for copiers.
The obvious question that arises is, Why would such a firm prefer leas
ing over selling? In this article I argue that one role of the lease-o
nly policy was to eliminate the market for secondhand goods. The artic
le formally demonstrates the argument, discusses the relationship betw
een this article and earlier literature on secondhand markets, and dis
cusses the implications for antitrust policy.