We consider a two-period, complete market economy in which agents' pre
ferences are represented by a non-additive expected utility. If agents
are optimistic, i.e. if the measure according to which they compute t
heir expected utility is subadditive, sunspots matter at equilibrium.
If agents are pessimistic, i.e. if their measure is convex, and share
the same beliefs, sunspots do not matter at equilibrium, and the (norm
alized) equilibrium price is indeterminate. In this latter case, one c
an even allow for different beliefs among agents and still have that s
unspots do not matter. The analysis is contrasted with the case of add
itive beliefs studied by Cass and Shell, Journal of Political Economy
91 (1983), pp. 193-227. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights rese
rved.