MINORITY REPRESENTATION IN MULTIMEMBER DISTRICTS

Given the recent court rulings against racial gerrymandering, the effe ct of multimember district elections on minority representation is an important issue. We present a model of voting in double-member distric t elections with two majority candidates and one minority candidate an d consider the voting equilibria under straight and cumulative voting. In straight voting, while an equilibrium always exists in which the t wo majority candidates are expected to win the two seats, minority can didates may be elected. In cumulative voting, minority candidate wins are also possible in equilibrium but are less likely when minority vot ers prefer one majority candidate over another. We then present experi mental evidence showing that minority candidates win significantly mor e seats in cumulative than in straight voting elections. When minority voters perceive a substantial difference between the majority candida tes, however, they are more likely to split their votes between the mi nority and majority candidates, winning fewer seats.