We analyze the importance of employment liability as a potential barri
er to welfare reform. In particular research linking wrongful terminat
ion doctrines to labor marker outcomes is integrated with empirical an
alyses of welfare caseloads to obtain evidence of the likely importanc
e of liability risk to the willingness of firms to hire welfare partic
ipants. Calculations suggest that liability concerns were probably not
a major factor in past decisions about whether or not to hire AFDC re
cipients. Nationally the elimination of tort liability for wrongful te
rmination could have provided additional jobs for fewer than one perce
nt of welfare recipients. However with evolving court doctrines, liabi
lity risks could become more important in the future, especially in th
ose state jurisdictions, such as California, where employers tradition
ally have faced the prospect of punitive damages for wrongful terminat
ion.