Because economics is unable to provide certain statements, agents' act
ion must rely on ''home-made'' substitution knowledge. This one is in
fact a collective product, named hereafter a referential. The referent
ial is a corpus of representations which privides a synoptic view of t
he working of the economy and helps agents to make themselves an idea
of what is ''good'' or ''bad'' for them. Mixing pieces of academic the
ory more or less ideological statements and various beliefs, the refer
ential is built in the interplay of multiple institutional talks. The
referential allows to settle an economic policy norm, whereas multiple
such norms were a priori possible. The present paper tries to show ho
w such an economic policy norm is self-stabilizing because of self-ful
filling prophecies effects, but how nevertheless it can be driven to c
risis as soon as doubts or critics on its relevance reappear. It is su
ggested that since the beginning of the 90's, the French economic poli
cy is faced with a return of multiple equilibria of norm: in short the
so-called ''desinflation competitive'' vs the ''other policy''. Becau
se of the competition between these two norms, the decisions of econom
ic policy may be quite indeterminate. It is proposed that not all the
societies are able, as the German is, to build the hermeneutic and sem
iotic devices which permit to contain indeterminacy on a long term hor
izon.