The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 made wholes
ale changes to the federal habeas corpus statute. In particular, the s
tatute contains a new section 2254(d), which controls the standards th
at federal habeas courts must employ when reviewing state convictions.
This new provision governing the standards of review applies generall
y to petitions filed after April 24, 1996, the effective date of the A
ct. The provision's text, however, is critically ambiguous in several
respects. Because most of the federal circuit courts of appeal have no
t yet settled even basic interpretive questions about section 2254(d),
federal district courts and circuit panels are often writing on a cle
an slate. In this Article, Professor Lee systematically offers interpr
etive suggestions to federal judges construing section 2254(d) for the
first time. Specifically, Professor Lee proposes answers to the follo
wing questions: (1) Whether different standards apply to pure legal qu
estions versus mixed questions of law and fact; (2) what test should b
e used to determine what state court applications of law to fact are '
'unreasonable;'' (3) what test should be used to ascertain when federa
l law is ''clearly established;'' and (4) to what degree federal habea
s courts may use decisions from the federal circuit courts when review
ing the constitutional infirmity of. state court adjudications.