2 DOGMAS OF CONCEPTUAL EMPIRICISM - IMPLICATIONS FOR HYBRID MODELS OFTHE STRUCTURE OF KNOWLEDGE

Concepts seem to consist of both an associative component based on tab ulations of feature typicality and similarity judgments and an explana tory component based on rules and causal principles. However, there is much controversy about how each component functions in concept acquis ition and use. Here we consider two assumptions, or dogmas, that embod y this controversy and underlie much of the current cognitive science research on concepts. Dogma 1: Novel information is first processed vi a similarity judgments and only later is influenced by explanatory com ponents. Dogma 2: Children initially have only a similarity-based comp onent for learning concepts; the explanatory component develops on the foundation of this earlier component. We present both empirical and t heoretical arguments that these dogmas are unfounded, particularly wit h respect to real world concepts; we contend that the dogmas arise fro m a particular species of empiricism that inhibits progress in the stu dy of conceptual structure; and finally, we advocate the retention of a hybrid model of the structure of knowledge despite our rejection of these dogmas. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science B.V.