It is argued that the proofs [W. D. Sharp and N. Shanks, Philos. Sci.
60. 488 (1993); O. Cohen, Phys. Rev. A 51, 4373 (1995); D. J. Miller,
Phys. Lett. A 222, 31 (1996)] of the general nonvalidity of the counte
rfactual interpretation of the Aharonov-Bergmann-Lebowitz rule [Y. Aha
ronov, P. G. Bergmann, and J. L. Lebowitz, Phys. Rev. 134, B1410 (1964
)] are perfectly valid, and that Vaidman's rejection of these proofs [
L. Vaidman, Phys. Rev. A (Comment for which this paper is the Reply)]
is unsustainable. It is demonstrated that Vaidman's proposed formulati
on of ''counterfactual probability,'' on which his rejection of these
proofs depends, is problematic and inconsistent in several respects. [
S1050-2947(98)03603-8].