POLITICAL-ECONOMY CONSIDERATIONS ON THE SUPPLY OF TRADE PROTECTION INREGIONAL-INTEGRATION AGREEMENTS

The purpose of this article is to discuss the institutional aspects of regional integration and its implication for the determination of ext ernal trade policies by a trade bloc. In particular, this study raises the question, can institutional designs in a regional integration are a increase the responsiveness of trade authorities to protectionist de mands? Contrary to some previous research, the analysis shows that the answer is affirmative. As illustrated by the European Union (EU) expe rience, the supply of trade protection in the context of regional inte gration crucially depends on the design and evolution of institutions adopted by the trade bloc. Moreover, the dynamic process of regional i ntegration entails a redefinition of rules which inevitably attracts l obbying activities (in particular from those with protectionist intere sts). In consequence, in the absence of a strong political commitment, the danger exists that the design of new institutions will be capture d by protectionist forces.