LOBSTER TRAP LIMITS - A SOLUTION TO A COMMUNAL ACTION PROBLEM

Most major fisheries of the world are becoming depleted, largely by hu man over-exploitation. The basic problem is that fishers cannot or wil l not generate rules to conserve the resources upon which their liveli hood depends. They are unable to solve this communal action dilemma al though all would gain. Some fisher groups have been able to establish conservation-oriented guidelines either by lobbying the state (a centr alized solution) or by generating self-imposed rules (a decentralized solution). We analyze the factors that allow lobster fishers on four M aine islands to benefit from self-imposed trap limits while most other lobster fishers must await decisions of the state legislature. It is argued that Knight's bargaining theory of norm development explains th e trap limit. At root, trap limit rules are the result of a distributi onal fight over the resource. However, a number of other factors are n ecessary for fishers to constrain themselves informally. This case mod ifies and extends the use of rational choice theory in understanding t he generation of rules for conserving resources.