In recent years a number of writers have defended and attacked various
features of structural, or neo-realist theories of international poli
tics. Few, however, have quarrelled with one of the most foundational
features of neorealist theory: its assumptions about the nature of sci
ence and scientific theories. In this essay I assess the views of scie
nce underlying much neorealist theory, especially as they are articula
ted in the work of Kenneth Waltz. I argue not only that neorealist the
ories rest on assumptions about science and theory that have been ques
tioned by postpositivist philosophers and historians of science, but a
lso that the failure to consider the work of these writers yields theo
ries of international politics that are deficient in several respects:
they are ''weak'' theories in the sense that they cannot illuminate c
rucial features of international politics, they presuppose and sustain
a narrow view of power and power relations, they reify practices and
relations in the international arena and they offer little promise of
producing the sort of ''Copernican Revolution'' for which Waltz called
(or, more modestly, even a minimally satisfactory theory of internati
onal politics). In light of these shortcomings, I sketch an alternativ
e approach to the study of international affairs, one that has been te
rmed ''prototype studies.'' I contend that such an approach provides s
cholars with a rigorous way of studying international politics, withou
t being a theoretical science.