PROBLEM LOANS AT NEW-ENGLAND BANKS, 1989 TO 1992 - EVIDENCE OF AGGRESSIVE LOAN POLICIES

Authors
Citation
Js. Jordan, PROBLEM LOANS AT NEW-ENGLAND BANKS, 1989 TO 1992 - EVIDENCE OF AGGRESSIVE LOAN POLICIES, New England economic review, 1998, pp. 23
Citations number
20
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
Journal title
ISSN journal
00284726
Year of publication
1998
Database
ISI
SICI code
0028-4726(1998):<23:PLANB1>2.0.ZU;2-E
Abstract
The New England banking industry experienced serious problems between 1989 and 1992. As the region's economy deteriorated, banks failed at a n unprecedented rate and many others barely survived. Banking problems were widespread, but they were not uniform. The ratio of nonperformin g loans to total loans was in excess of 10 percent for some New Englan d banks, below 1 percent for others, even though all faced the externa l shock of the collapse in the region's real estate market. This study attempts to determine whether a 'skills' hypothesis or a 'policies' h ypothesis better explains the differences among banks in the severity of their loan problems. The 'skills' hypothesis posits that banks with the greatest loan problems were those that employed managers with def icient skills. The 'policies' hypothesis posits that banks with the gr eatest loan problems were those that chose higher loan-to-asset ratios , held a greater concentration of riskier types of loans, or accepted riskier loan customers. The author uses an analysis of profit and cost efficiency to help identify the hypothesis that better explains the d isparity. He finds evidence in support of the 'policies' hypothesis. C onscious decisions by bank managers regarding the riskiness of their l oan portfolios, as well as the level of capital to hold, help explain why some New England banks were able to survive the real estate crisis while others failed.