STRATEGY-PROOFNESS AND SINGLE-PLATEAUED PREFERENCES

In the framework of the provision of one pure public good, we obtain a characterization of the class of strategy-proof voting schemes on sin gle-plateaued preferences over a convex and closed subset of the real line (the set of feasible levels of the public good). Moulin [8] compl etely characterizes strategy-proof voting schemes on single-peaked pre ferences as the family of minmax rules. We obtain the result that any strategy-proof voting scheme on the domain of single-plateaued prefere nces can be viewed as a two-stage procedure. First, we choose a Moulin 's minmax rule. Then, in the tie-breaking stage, we select one represe ntative alternative from each voter's plateau using a strategy-proof s cheme with respect to the other voters. The final choice is obtained b y applying the minmax rule to the representative best alternatives. Si milarly, we can also characterize the subclass of strategy-proof socia l choice functions satisfying uncompromisingness. (C) 1998 Elsevier Sc ience B.V.