This article contrasts the constitutional treatment of two types of te
rritorially defined political subdivisions: local governments and elec
toral districts. The Supreme Court treats racially segregated electora
l districts as constitutionally suspect while generally insulating mor
e severely segregated local governments from constitutional scrutiny.
An analysis of recent opinions involving both reapportionment and loca
l government reveals the reason for this discrepancy: The Court genera
lly describes the role of government in electoral reapportionment as t
he active creation of subdivisions, whereas it describes the state's r
ole in local government formation as the passive recognition of privat
e residential decisions. The article argues that although superficiall
y plausible, this dualism does not distinguish the electoral districts
the Court attacks from the local governments it fails to scrutinize,
nor should it be constitutionally relevant. The article argues that th
e disparate treatment of racially defined electoral districts and simi
larly situated local governments actually reflects a deeper tension in
normative political thought between the desire for subgroup integrati
on and the desire for subgroup representation through political solida
rity. Because both desires are important, the goal of legal reform sho
uld not be ''consistency,'' but rather a more informed effort at media
ting the tension between the two desires. An analysis of social geogra
phy and normative political theory relevant to race relations suggests
that almost the opposite approach would be appropriate. A very differ
ent approach from that of the Court would allow racially defined elect
oral districts, wherein the dominant group must still negotiate with a
broader political community at the legislative level in order to wiel
d political power, and severely scrutinize racially defined local gove
rnments, wherein the dominant group directly exercises state power wit
hout the tempering influence of a broader political conversation.