THE ABA SHOULD NOT DELAY ON PAY-TO-PLAY - REGULATING THE POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF LAWYERS TO GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WHO AWARD LEGAL CONTRACTS

Authors
Citation
Ma. Heinicke, THE ABA SHOULD NOT DELAY ON PAY-TO-PLAY - REGULATING THE POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF LAWYERS TO GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WHO AWARD LEGAL CONTRACTS, Stanford law review, 49(6), 1997, pp. 1523-1546
Citations number
60
Journal title
ISSN journal
00389765
Volume
49
Issue
6
Year of publication
1997
Pages
1523 - 1546
Database
ISI
SICI code
0038-9765(1997)49:6<1523:TASNDO>2.0.ZU;2-C
Abstract
Pay-to-play occurs when a lawyer donates money to a politician's campa ign in order to get preferential treatment in the awarding of governme nt legal contracts. In this note, Malcolm Heinicke identifies and expl ains the problems created by the reality and even the perception of su ch pay-to-play practices among lawyers. Heinicke pays particular atten tion to the field of municipal finance. Within this context, the note shows that, when government officials base their contract awards on ca mpaign contributions, investors, taxpayers, honest lawyers, and the le gal profession as a whole suffer. Heinicke argues that the American Ba r Association should adopt a set of regulations currently under consid eration that would curtail the existence as well as the appearance of pay-to-play abuses. For purposes of comparison, the note illustrates h ow similar rules for securities underwriters have withstood court chal lenges and proven successful.