CAPACITIES, UNIVERSALITY, AND SINGULARITY

Authors
GLENNAN SS
Citation
Ss. Glennan, CAPACITIES, UNIVERSALITY, AND SINGULARITY, Philosophy of science, 64(4), 1997, pp. 605-626
Citations number
19
Journal title
Philosophy of science → ACNP
ISSN journal
00318248
Volume
64
Issue
4
Year of publication
1997
Pages
605 - 626
Database
ISI
SICI code
0031-8248(1997)64:4<605:CUAS>2.0.ZU;2-I
Abstract
In this paper I criticize Cartwright's analysis of capacities and offe r an alternative analysis. I argue that Cartwright's attempt to connec t capacities to her condition CC fails because individuals can exercis e capacities only in certain contexts. My own analysis emphasizes thre e features of capacities: 1) Capacities belong to individuals; 2) Capa cities are typically not metaphysically fundamental properties of indi viduals, but can be explained by referring to structural properties of individuals; and 3) Laws are best understood as ascriptions of capaci ties.