S. Gluck et S. Gimbel, DISCUSSION - AN INTERVENING CAUSE COUNTEREXAMPLE TO RAILTONS DNP MODEL OF EXPLANATION, Philosophy of science, 64(4), 1997, pp. 692-697
Peter Railton (1978) has introduced the influential deductive-nomologi
cal-probabilistic (DNP) model of explanation which is the culmination
of a tradition of formal, non-pragmatic accounts of scientific explana
tion. The other models in this tradition have been shown to be suscept
ible to a class of counterexamples involving intervening causes which
speak against their sufficiency. This treatment has never been extende
d to the DNP model; we contend that the usual form of these counterexa
mples is ineffective in this case, However, we develop below a new ver
sion which overcomes these difficulties. Thus we claim that ail of the
models in this tradition, DNP included, have an equal status with res
pect to sufficiency.