Bioethics are not metaphysically neutral. They share the naturalistic
worldview at large. According to this view, there are no objective val
ues, but only pure facts and physical mechanisms. Under this premise,
it depends on essentially subjective factors, namely interests, whethe
r manipulations of human beings are allowed or not. If so, there is no
reason, based on the human nature itself, for nor considering and fin
ally using humans as organ-stores, or treating them under the rule of
political preconceptions. In today's medicine, psychiatry primarily ha
s to deal with human beings as persons. The concept of person, however
, cannot be explained without referring to values. Therefore, psychiat
ry is especially competent to resist the pressure of naturalism. At th
e same rime, in longing for becoming a thouroughly empirical science,
psychiatry is particularly tempted to give way to naturalism This temp
tation, then, causes the danger oi moving out of the resistance center
against naturalistic metaphysics, i.e. giving up the traditional conc
ept of person.