TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY - UNPREDICTABLE ELITE NEGOTIATION OR PREDICTABLE FAILURE TO ACHIEVE CLASS COMPROMISE

Can democratic transitions be predicted? The elite-negotiation literat ure claims that the process is so complicated and contingent that the timing and process is unpredictable. The class-compromise framework, h owever, identifies structural conditions that make stabilization unlik ely, specifying who will oppose the authoritarian regime and why. A '' triggering'' event-a collapse in export demand-also is identified that intensifies and extends opposition, making a transition likely within 1-3 years. To demonstrate the usefulness of the class-compromise fram ework, two very different authoritarian regimes are compared. In the B razilian regime (1964-1985), the military ruled as an institution and pursued state-led development; the Chilean regime (1973-1989) was domi nated by one general and was radically neo-liberal. Despite these diff erences, structural conditions pushed both regimes toward export-led g rowth and wage constraint hurting workers and capitalists producing fo r the local market. When exports collapsed in the early 1980s, opposit ion spread and forced democratic transitions.