The model presented in this paper measures the rate of decoupling achi
eved by the compensatory payments package provided under 'CAP/Oilseeds
Reform' legislation. Results from the model suggest that, contrary to
expectations, we may view the compensatory payments as 'effectively f
ully decoupled' from production of wheat, rapeseed and soybeans. Three
factors drive this result. First, when compared with base period retu
rns, the compensatory payments 'skew' crop revenue per hectare. Second
, the set-aside and 'Blair House accord' area restrictions on the mode
l ensure effective full decoupling for rapeseed and soybeans. (Without
these restrictions, the payments package is only partially decoupled
from production of these crops.) Finally as currently designed, the mo
del does not allow land to leave crop production; thus, if area in one
crop decreases in response to changes in prices and/or payments, area
in at least one other crop must increase. For coarse grains and sunfl
ower the model generates decoupling rates of 80 per cent and 70 per ce
nt respectively suggesting partial decoupling of the payments package
from production of these crops.