The article argues that the unification of Germany and the withdrawal
of Soviet Russia from Central Europe have paved the way for a new ''Mi
ddle Europe'' - composed of states crossing the old Cold War borderlin
e. NATO's 1997 Madrid Summit gave us a preliminary answer to the shape
and form of this new ''Middle Europe'' as well as an idea about the r
ole and shape of the NATO to come. Both in terms of quantity and quali
ty this will be a new NATO comprising new approaches, priorities and i
nternal alliances. The article asks particularly which motives and exp
ectations the Central European and German elites might have founded th
eir pro-enlargement policy. It argues that from a Central European per
spective, NATO membership is perceived as an historical chance for the
region to break out of the role as a ''playground'' for Russian or Ge
rman predominance and secure a future role as a genuine ''player'' in
European diplomacy. From a German point of view enlargement might have
been perceived as the optimal solution to three questions which have
challenged Germany since 1990: How could Germany 1) escape the positio
n as a ''western front state'', 2) implement its new sovereignty in a
more ''national'' and independent German foreign economy and policy, i
ncluding security policy, 3) pursue these two goals without ending up
with the old trauma of a European anti-German alliance?