THE BOUNDARIES OF ABORTION LAW - SYSTEMS-THEORY FROM PARSONS TO LUHMANN AND HABERMAS

This article examines competing hypotheses on law derived from the the ories of Talcott Parsons, Niklas Luhmann, and Jurgen Habermas in light of the recent history of U.S. abortion law, specifically the Supreme Court's rulings on abortion over the past two decades. The evidence I advance suggests that Luhmann's theory cannot explain how abortion law since 1973 has developed with the influence of certain nonlegal conte xts. The perspectives of Parsons and Habermas, on the other hand adequ ately grasp some of the outside influences on the legal abortion proce ss. Parsons's theory particularly shows its strength in accounting for the political influences on abortion law and the individualistic natu re of the American legal system. Habermas's theory rightly emphasizes the delicate force of lifeworld claims over the normativity of law as well as the relevance of a medical-technocratic reformulation of legal justifications. I conclude by arguing that sociological analyses of l aw should strive to conceptually elucidate the continuing struggles ov er and through law, and that they should recognize, particularly in li ght of growing multiculturalism, the loss of integrative force modern law continues to ascribe to itself.