SOME EVIDENCE OF CONGRESSIONAL POLITICAL MARKETS IN DOD PERSONNEL ALLOCATIONS ACROSS STATES

An empirical analysis of the distribution of Department of Defense (DO D) personnel (both military and civilian) across states is developed w ith a commonly used Public Choice model of resource allocation in a le gislative setting. The model specification employs Congressional senio rity, Congressional committee representation, Presidential electoral v otes, and the per capita dollar value of prime defense contract awards to explain the variation of DOD personnel across states over time. Th e empirical analysis is performed over the last three decades, and the results indicate that this particular Public Choice legislative model performs well in explaining the variation in DOD personnel allocation s across states. The results also provide some limited evidence of a p ossible political market between the states for DOD personnel allocati ons. This analysis has implications for future testing of whether the Base Realignment and Closure Commission (established in 1988 under Pre sident Reagan), and the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commissio n of 1990 (under President Bush) were effective in significantly decre asing the legislative politics involved in the selection and approval process for base closure and realignment.