DUHEMS PHYSICALISM

Duhem is often described as an anti-realist or instrumentalist. A cont rary view has recently beer! expressed by Martin (1991) (Pierre Duhem: Philosophy ann History in the Work of a Believing Physicist (La Salle , IL: Open Court)), who suggests that this interpretation makes it dif ficult to understand the vantage point from which Duhem argues in La s cience allemande (1915) that deduction, however impeccable, cannot est ablish truths unless it begins with truths. In the same spirit, the pr esent paper seeks to establish that Duhem is at any rate not the kind of anti-realist he is often presented as being, and that his views are like those Quine sees fit to call realist. An interpretation of Duhem 's views on explanation and precision in science, and their bearing on the epistemological status of theory, is advanced which leads natural ly into his critique of conventionalism. His attitude towards atomism, which should not be judged from a post-1925 perspective, is considere d part of the unified view he strove after and appropriately called Du hem's physicalism, standing in contrast to the kind of reductionist co nception usually associated with atomism.