Lilenfeld's attack on my conceptual examination of the disease concept
of alcoholism suffers from erroneous interpretations, fallacious reas
oning, and a lack of familiarity with relevant alcoholism research. He
offers an alternative nominalist interpretation of the disease concep
t of alcoholism based on a fuzzy boundary between disease and wellness
. He fails to recognize that the basic issue between nominalist and re
alist accounts of a lower-order concept such as alcoholism is the pres
ence or absence of general principles that may account for the observe
d signs and symptoms characterizing a specific disease entity, not fuz
zy boundaries between higher-order categories. Extensive evidence (whi
ch Lilienfeld ignores) of biological bases for the pathognomic signs a
nd symptoms of alcoholism, particularly loss of control, demonstrates
that the disease concept of alcoholism refers to a disease entity that
has a biological basis. It is not a ''mental construct.''