Crm. Scholten et al., COST-CONTROL AND MEDICAL SPECIALIST PAYMENT - THE DUTCH ALTERNATIVE, The International journal of health planning and management, 13(1), 1998, pp. 69-82
The fee-for-service system is a growing problem for insurers and gover
nments. The main reason for this is the open-ended character of this s
ystem which makes cost-control a very difficult task. The pressures on
the fee-for-service system are becoming more pronounced, especially i
n countries such as Canada, Germany and the Netherlands which use budg
et restrictions on national health care expenditure (macro caps). In t
hese countries policy makers are searching for an alternative payment
system and an appropriate definition of a corresponding status for doc
tors. The alternative, however, does not have to lead automatically to
a salaried status of doctors in the hospital organization. The Dutch
experience of the change of the payment system for medical specialists
illustrates the transition to a new 'negotiated order'. The introduct
ion of the 'lump sum' and the sub-contractor relationship with the ins
urance companies leaves the organizational autonomy of medical special
ists intact. In exchange the medical specialists cooperate with the in
surers in trying to control the costs of health care. In this process
of strategic change, two factors are very significant: i.e. the new le
adership of the local medical specialists and the governmental 'circum
vention' of the powerful associations of doctors and insurers. (C) 199
8 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.