In theory, economic instruments should overcome the market failures th
at lead to excessive deforestation. Secure property rights could be es
tablished and enforced to eliminate the open access problem. In practi
ce, the size of the welfare loss that arises from market failures in t
he forest sector in the absence of such first-best policies is determi
ned by the incentives, prices, and policies faced by those who make de
cisions about land use. In many cases, the effects of policies on defo
restation are not straightforward. For example, there ave conflicting
views on whether an increase in the price of logs leads to an increase
or a decrease in deforestation. The effect of a change in the price o
f logs has particular relevance for the controversial debate about the
effect on deforestation of a ban on log exports or other trade restri
ctions that lower the domestic price of logs. This article provides an
analytical framework for determining the effects of changes in econom
ic policies and parameters on deforestation. It models dynamic, profit
-maximizing land-use choices and obtains unambiguous comparative stati
c results by distinguishing between unmanaged and managed forests. The
results suggest that measures to reduce the producer price of logs co
uld be a second-best policy to reduce the pressures on the frontiers o
f unmanaged forests and to protect biodiversity.