C. Mischo et al., WHAT IS MORE CONVINCING IN ARGUMENTATION - RHETORICAL AESTHETICS OR COMMUNICATIVE FAIRNESS, Zeitschrift fur experimentelle Psychologie, 44(4), 1997, pp. 656-685
In this study we focus on the relation between argumentational integri
ty and aesthetics concerning their persuasive effects. With regard to
the relation between (un-)fairness and aesthetic quality we have outli
ned three prototypical cases, which were empiricially tested as explor
atory hypotheses: (a) superiority of aesthetics (b) fairness as a nece
ssary condition for aesthetic effects, (c) compensation of a lack of a
esthetics by fairness and vice versa. The variation of (un-)fairness o
f argumentational contributions is based on the empirically validated
concept of argumentational integrity. The aesthetic quality of an utte
rance was conceptualized in a multi-relational manner based on a semio
tic model of deviation what classifies rhetoric-stilistic figures as s
yntactic, semantic or pragmatic deviations,,Persuasive effectiveness'
was operationalized by cognitive, emotional, and evaluative variables.
In order to test hypotheses, argumentational episodes were constructe
d, representing different combinations of the two factors of (un-)fair
ness and aesthetic quality. After a factor analysis of the dependend v
ariables, our conceptualization of aesthetics was validated in a desig
n of variance analysis. Concerning our three prototypical cases, the d
ata strongly support case (b) ''fairness as a necessary condition for
aesthetic effects''. The data clearly show that in the case of fair co
ntributions, semiotic deviations were considered particularly convinci
ng, whereas in the case of unfair contributions, semiotic deviations c
ould not compensate for the negative effects of unfairness.