Persistent high unemployment has destabilized the labor relations syst
em in France. Jobs have become an ever more important issue in negotia
tions about the time spent working. By combining legal and sociologica
l analyses, it is shown that regulatory oversight has, since the 1980s
, taken the place of a quite decentralized bargaining process that for
med an exception to legal rules. Although jobs often stand at the top
of the agenda in negotiations about work-time, it is less an actually
targeted objective than a bargaining chip for working out agreements o
n other topics. The issue of jobs claps up in three types of situation
s. First of all, jobs may serve as a mere pretext for opening negotiat
ions about the time spent working. Secondly the jobs issue can also le
ad to solid commitments in exchange for measures allowing for more fle
xibility Thirdly, it may be a formal objective for negotiators bargain
ing about work-time even though no party has any real interest in reac
hing such an objective. This diversity of cases and of forms of commit
ment raises question about the traditional principles of labor law.