Ronald Dworkin's Freedom's Law proposes a novel and controversial meth
od of interpreting the Constitution called ''the moral reading.'' Acco
rding to the moral reading, judges decide constitutional cases arising
under the abstract provisions of the Constitution and Bill of Rights
by deciding the appropriate scope of the moral principles of liberty a
nd equality that those provisions embody and by making ''fresh moral j
udgments'' in order to apply those principles in concrete cases. In Fr
eedom's Law, Professor Dworkin alo attempts to defend the moral readin
g against the frequent charge that it is undemocratic because it deleg
ates too much control over social and moral policy to an unelected and
politically unaccountable elite corps of federal judges. In this book
review, Ara Lovitt argues that Dworkin's defense of the moral reading
will be unpersuasive to those readers whose views of constitutional i
nterpretation are informed by the justifications for judicial review i
n a democratic society.